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1.69steganography and detect what information is embedded.
Many effective steganalysis methods are proposed in the past
decade [4-8]. Steganalysis may be very useful for analyzing
a highly suspicious image where some hidden information is
believed to be embedded with a known steganography
method. However, most of the steganalysis is only valid for
a certain kind of steganography method because the
mechanism of the steganalysis is based on the specific
statistic features of steganography algorithms. As discussed
above, there may be millions of images transmitted over
Internet some of which may contain hidden messages by
hundreds of different steganography methods. Therefore, it is
extremely difficult to detect which kind of steganography
method is used for a certain image. Then it is also difficult to
locate a steganalysis method targeting that steganography
method. In fact, over Internet, most of the information is
secure where no hidden information is embedded, so huge
resources will be wasted if all the images over Internet are
tested by many different kinds of steganalysis methods. In
all, steganalysis as a passive and non-generic countermeasure
to steganography is not proper for the Internet environment.

Abstract—In order to prevent harmful secret information
sharing
by
steganography,
a
new
active-warden
countermeasure approach against steganography is proposed
in this paper. Differently from the other countermeasure
approaches presented in current literature which need to have
some knowledge of the steganographic algorithms to be
attacked, our proposed method is a generic method which is
independent of any particular steganography methods being
utilized. In other words, our approach blindly attacks the
steganography without any prior knowledge of the used
algorithms or their existence. In general, the hidden
information is embedded in a carrier by adjusting the
coefficients of the audio or image. In our method, by exploiting
the large margin between the numerical value and visual
perception of the images, large amounts of visually nondetectable distortions are incurred in the image. As a result,
the hidden message is destroyed by this method while the
perceptual quality of the image is maintained. Inspired by the
print-scan process in which most of the steganographic
methods cannot survive, a transform called Discrete Spring
Transform (DST) is proposed in this paper as the foundation of
our attack algorithm. An image geometrization method is also
developed to reconstruct the image in this paper. The
simulation results have demonstrated that the PSNR of the
attacked image is above 30dB with a high perceptive quality
while the BER of the hidden steganographic message in the
attacked image is above 0.5.

In [11], an active steganalysis method is proposed against
QIM steganography. It is an active method which is capable
of detecting whether QIM steganography exists in the cover
media or not using a measure of entropy which is called
approximate entropy. It has advantages over passive
steganalysis which is not able to detect the existence of such
steganography. However the proposed method can only work
against QIM steganography. In [12], a learning based
steganalysis method is proposed. Instead of using the
common SVM scheme, here an ensemble classifier is
utilized in [12] to achieve a lower complexity learning
process. Nevertheless, the learning process requires a large
amount of test data and only works on known steganography
methods. In [13] and [14], active warden approach is
discussed to eliminate steganography in the Internet traffic.
The potential advantages for active warden methods are
investigated. In [15], [16] and [17] are some specific active
warden based attacking approaches against video, audio and
image steganography. All those methods attempt to remove
the steganography in the cover media while preserving the
perceptual quality of the cover media, but they all require
some prior knowledge to some extent.

Keywords—steganography; multimedia security; print-scan
process; human visual system

I.

INTRODUCTION

Security is a rising problem in wireless communication
and networks. Steganography is a potentially strong method
to transmit secret information especially by hiding messages
in the multimedia data through networks [1]. Though
steganography provides a way to transmit hidden
information, however, the malicious use of steganography
draws another stringent security problem. Evidences have
shown that terrorists use steganography to broadcast
operation instruction and training manuals on the Internet
[2]. Consequently, preventing malicious information
transmission over Internet is a critical issue for public
security. The prominent difficulty is that the steganography
will not draw any attention. In other words, it is difficult to
perceptually identify whether an image/video/audio is hidden
with some information or not. Furthermore, it is even hard or
impossible to detect which steganography method is used
since there are hundreds of existing steganography methods.

A generic active countermeasure method is desired to be
used in many real world scenarios where the prior
knowledge of the steganographic algorithms may not be
available at all. In this paper, we assume all the images
transmitted through a server on the Internet are applied by
our proposed method. The visual perceptual quality of the

Steganalysis is a kind of countermeasures to
steganography[3]. Steganalysis tries to detect the
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output images should be at an acceptable level which means
that no significant visual distortion can be found in the
output images. In the same time, the hidden information
embedded in the compromised images are securely removed.
It doesn’t necessarily mean the hidden message is totally
destroyed. It will be found in the next section of this paper
that rather than destroying the hidden information, the
position of the hidden information is disordered so that the
receiver is not able to recover the hidden information.
Though the exact hidden information is not able to be
discovered as in the steganalysis method, the malicious
information spreading will be prevented and the network can
be kept at a high security level.

non-noticeable. To make this geometric deviation smarter, an
Analog Location Transform (ALT) is proposed to make the
deviation rate inversely proportional to the visual
significance of the image area. A geometrized image DST
method is proved to be effective by the simulation results.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The discrete
spring transform is presented in section II. In section III,
geometrized image reconstruction method is described. The
simulation results are shown in section IV. Finally, we draw
conclusion in section V.
II.

DISCRETE SPRING TRANSFORM

A. Analog Location Transform
A major reason why most of the steganography methods
fail to survive from the print-scan process is the geometrical
location deviation distortion. The mechanical structure of the
printer and the aligning error during the print-scan process
will easily make the original pixels deviate from their
original locations. This deviation will not remove the hidden
information embedded in the pixels but it will let the receiver
unable to locate and synchronously decode the hidden
information. First of all, the random and variant deviation
distance is very difficult to be found. Meanwhile, since the
deviation in each pixel is relatively small and random, this
deviation distortion cannot make a general impact on the
perceptual quality of the image. Human visual system is not
sensitive to this geometrical distortion. This physical pixel
location deviation can be virtually modeled as an analog
location transform (ALT). A single dimensional signal
Discrete Spring Transform can be illustrated in Fig.1 where
the dash line denotes the original locations of the signal.

In order to find such a generic method, the steganography
attack scheme should not be based on any specific
steganographic mechanisms. In general, the steganography
methods take advantage of the human visual system to hide
information. Due to the limitation of the human visual
system, by properly designing, the slight changes of the
image’s numerical values either in spatial domain or
transform domain will not draw significant perceptible
distortions [7]. This flexibility of the image values provides a
capacity to carry hidden information. The countermeasure
also can take advantage of the human visual system. In our
proposed method, we try to maximize the distinction
between the human visual perception and the numerical
value of the image to make the maximum numerical change
to the image while keeping the image visually unchanged.
The significant numerical change of the image will make the
hidden message difficult to be recovered. It should be noted
that since the idea behind the proposed method is to change
the numerical value of the image, the traditional MeanSquare Error (MSE) measurement is not fair to evaluate the
image quality of the output image applied by the proposed
method. In section V, a subjective image evaluation method
is adopted to validate the results.

For a M×N image 𝐴(𝑚, 𝑛) , the ALT-based Discrete
Spring Transform is presented as
𝐴 𝑚, 𝑛 → 𝐴! 𝑚 ! , 𝑛!

The print-scan is a physical process which generally
meets the properties of the countermeasure method as
mentioned above. The state-of-art printer and scanner are
capable of presenting and recovering a digital image in a
very high visual quality. However, the numerical values of
the rescanned image may be largely different from the
original one. Meanwhile, it is also demonstrated that most of
the steganography method is not robust to the print-scan
process [15]. Even though there are a few data hiding
algorithms which can survive the print-scan process, the
data-hiding bandwidth or capacity is severely constrained.
Inspired by the print-scan process, a countermeasure method
called Discrete Spring Transform (DST) is elaborated in
section II and section III. A preliminary consideration of
DST has been initially reported in our previous work [15].
Such DST can be tweaked as a countermeasure to
steganography which is even stronger than physical print and
scan. In fact, a major distortion introduced by print-scan
process is geometric distortion to which human visual system
is not sensitive. It also looks like a spring which are stretched
a little bit. In every point of the spring, it is stretched at a
different rate. But the entire spring is stretched smoothly
where the specific stretching difference in a single point is

where
𝑚!
1             0               ∆! 𝑚, 𝑛
𝑛! = 0              1                ∆! 𝑚, 𝑛
0              0
1
  1

𝑚
𝑛   
1

(𝑚, 𝑛 ∈ ℤ    𝑚 ! , 𝑛! ∈ ℝ)

Fig.1 1-D Discrete Spring Transform
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!!!!!

This transform is a spatial-variant transform which differs
from a conventional affine transform or geometric transform.
Please note the variant of the deviation distance ∆! 𝑚, 𝑛
and ∆! 𝑚, 𝑛 is a key reason why the hidden message in the
attacked image is unable to be recovered. In order that the
deviation does not mess up with the relative postion of the
pixels, the transform functions are confined as ∆! , ∆! ≤ 0
and ∀  𝑚 = 0  or  𝑛 = 0, 0 ≤ ∆! (𝑚, 𝑛)  , ∆! (𝑚, 𝑛) , ∀  𝑚 =
M − 1  or    n = N − 1, ∆! 𝑚, 𝑛   , ∆! 𝑚, 𝑛 ≤ 0 .
This
condition makes sure that the location of each pixel is
deviated only in relation to its nearby area. The probability
density function can be expressed as

P ∆! 𝑚, 𝑛

1
,
= 2γ!
0,

    𝑙! 𝑚, k =

!!!

d𝐴
𝑚, y
dy

!

+ 1 dy

In other words, the expression above shows that we can
manipulate the deviation of the pixel positions in the 2-D
plane in such a way that the deviation of position is related to
the pixel values.
After the position deviation process, each pixel is moved
to a new location where the coordinates may not be integral
due to the nature of analog location transform. A novel pixel
geometrization method is proposed in next section to
reconstruct the image pixels by virtually implementing the
scanning process.
III.

−γ! < ∆! 𝑚, 𝑛 < γ!

GEOMETRIZED IMAGE RECONSTRUCTION

Assume a scanner will scan the image back into digital
form based on the image which is virtually printed by the
ALT method. The virtual ink dot position is overlapped due
to the pixel position deviation and ink spreading. The ink
volume for each pixel is assumed to be proportional to the
pixel’s value. As a result, a larger ink volume dot will be
spread in a larger circle area which can be denoted as

  otherwise

where i = 1,2  and 0 < γ! < 0.5 is the variable range of the
deviation distance. This maximum deviation distance
provides a reference threshold for the following method
where the deviation distance is associated with the properties
of the human visual system. These thresholds will then be
used for normalizing the deviation distance functions.

  𝐴! x ! , y ! = πr x, y

!

where r denotes the radius of the ink dot circle. Considering
this ink spreading phenomenon and the deviated ink dot
center point, it is easy to express and manipulate the
distortion to the virtually printed image. For the scanning
process, a square-shaped scanning window with side length d
is defined. The scanning window slides in the 2-D plane
vertically and horizontally and generates the digitized pixel
values at discrete locations. The ink volume captured in the
scanning window is quantified to reconstruct the image
pixels. Each ink dot will have impact on a group of neighbor
pixels. Though the overlap between the scanning window
and ink dot can be modeled in many different patterns, it can
be formulated with a concise expression. Fig.2 illustrates
some examples of the scanned image pixels corresponding to
the ink dots. The arrows indicate the deviation directions of
ink dots and the ink dot size is propotional to the pixel value.

B. Curve Length Method
In order to remove the hidden information from the
image, the deviation distance is expected to be as large as
possible to result in numerical distortions. On the other hand,
larger distortions will obviously deteriorate the image quality.
Generally, the distortion is preferred to be involved in the
image areas where the human visual system is not sensitive.
It is also reasonable that those areas are more suspicious to
have hidden information because the change is less
noticeable. For example, human visual system is more likely
to notice the contrast of the pixels than the pixel intensity
itself [10]. Consequently, the area with edges of objects
within the image has less tolerance for the distortions than
the plain area. Then larger deviation distance needs to be
introduced in the plain area. In this paper, we propose a socalled “curve length” method to model this distinction in the
image between the high contrast areas and the plain areas,
and increase or suppress the deviation distance accordingly.
The curve length method is capable of progressively and
smoothly manipulating the transition from the plain area to
the edge area.
To calculate the curve length map for an image, the
image is interpolated at first. The 2-D interpolated signal can
be expressed as
𝑚, 𝑛 = 𝐴 𝑚, 𝑛 ∗ 𝑊! (𝑚, 𝑛)
where W! is the interpolation window kernel which is a 2-D
extension of Lanczos window kernel. The curve length
between 𝐴(𝑘, 𝑛) and 𝐴(𝑘 + 1, 𝑛) horizontally and between
𝐴(𝑚, 𝑘)   and 𝐴(𝑚, 𝑘 + 1)verticaly can be presented as
!!!!!

  𝑙! k, 𝑛 =

!!!

d𝐴
x, 𝑛
dx

!

Fig.2 Examples of Geometrized Image Representation

+ 1 dx
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As shown in Fig.2, one ink dot may be spread into eight
nearby scanning windows. Therefore nine pixel values are
affected by this dot after the virtual scanning transformation.
The ink volume spread by 𝐴 𝑖, 𝑗 to the neighbor pixels can
be expressed as
S

!,!

S

i ± 1, j = 𝑇

d
− ∆!   i, j
2
−S

S

d
d
∓ ∆!   𝑖, 𝑗 , ∓ ∆! 𝑖, 𝑗
2
2

i ± 1, j ± 1 = 𝑃 ! !,!

!,!

!,!

i, j ± 1 = 𝑇

!,!

!,!

!,!

i ± 1, j − 1

!,!

i − 1, j ± 1

i ± 1, j + 1

!,!

−S

i + 1, j ± 1
!

S

−S

d
− ∆!   i, j
2
−S

images have been collected to evaluate and validate the
proposed attacking method. In our experiments, a 32-bit
secret information is hidden in the 256 by 256 images. Three
different categories of image are tested in this section which
include the images featured with textures, portraits and
animals. The simulation results shown in Fig. 4 are averaged
values. In Fig. 4, the proposed attacking method is evaluated
in two aspects including the strength of the attack and the
quality of the processed images. In order to meet the
requirement of removing the steganography, the BER of the
hidden message needs to be close to 0.5. In Fig. 4 (a), the
side length of the attacking window which is defined as the
scanning window is changed from 4 to 9. It is shown that the
attack is not effective when the side length of the window is
greater than 6. This is because the scanning window allows
most of the geometrized pixels are gathered into the original
scanning window. In other words, the virtual scan process
does not take effect, and the image data are basically the
same as those in the original image. Therefore less
distortions are involved between the neighboring pixels,
resulting in that the stego-data are untouched. When the
window side length is less than 5, however, the BERs
become much greater. On the other hand, Fig. 4(b) shows
that the PSNR of each category of the pictures is above 30dB
when the window side is 4 to 5, meaning that the processed
images have been protected to maintain a satisfactory visual
quality.

!

i, j = πr ! i, j −

S

!,!

i + p, j + q

!!!! !!!!

where  

!
x
− x r! − x!, 0
r
expresses the area in a circle divided by a chord and

𝑇 x = r ! arccos

1
S x +S y
𝑃 x, y =
2

πr !
+ xy −
,0
4

!

To sum up, the proposed steganography attacking method
can be very effective in terms of removing the hidden
message while protecting the hosting image quality. The
attacking window size is a critical perimeter in designing the
attack algorithm. Our experiments have demonstrated that
the algorithm has the best performance when the side length
of the window is 4 to 5 when the images are of size 256 by
256.

presents the area in the middle of the two intersecting chords.
Then the reconstructed image or the virtually scanned image
can be expressed as
!!!

!!!

𝑆 (!,!) (𝑖, 𝑗)

𝐴! 𝑖, 𝑗 =
!!!!! !!!!!

IV.

V.

SIMULATION RESULTS

CONCLUSION

In this paper, we have investigated on how to attack the
steganography in digital images without degrading
perceptual qualities of the host images. We have proposed a
novel approach called Discrete Spring Transform and
applied this approach into a virtual print and scan process, in
which the images were virtually converted into different
domains. Our experimental results have demonstrated that
the proposed method is very effective in removing the stegodata, with its BER as high as 0.5 while the qualities of the
host images are satisfactorily maintained with PSNR mostly
higher than 30dB.

The spread spectrum steganography is used in this
section to evaluate the proposed method. In experiments, 32
bit-information is hidden in the 256 by 256 images. Three
different categories images are tested in this section which
are textures, portraits and animals. Thirty pictures in each
category are tested by the proposed method.
A typical result of the proposed attacking method based
on the DST and virtual print-scan scheme is illustrated in Fig.
3 with a comparison against the original input image. It
demonstrates that the artifact of the proposed attack is
perceptually unnoticeable, even though the hidden message
has been successfully removed from the image. In the
attacked picture, the BER (Bit Error Rate) of the hidden
information is 0.5 which means the receiver is not able to
decode the hidden information with a performance better
than the random guess.
In our following experiments, the robust spread spectrum
based steganography which is one of the current main stream
steganographic methods is targeted for attack. The
performance data including BER of the decoded stego-data
and PSNR (Peak Signal to Noise Ratio) of the processed

Fig. 3 Comparison between Original and Attacked Image
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Fig. 4(a) BER of the Attacking Results for Different Picture Categories
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